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A Creditor’s Kerfuffle: How the SBRA Harms 
Creditors in Small Business Cases  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Small Business Reorganization Act (“SBRA”) took effect on 
February 19, 2020.1   Under the SBRA, subchapter V was created, 
generating a new avenue for small business debtors to attempt to 
reorganize their debts and continue their businesses.2  The SBRA does 
not eliminate the law governing debtors who elect to undergo a traditional 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy process.3 Instead, subchapter V provides an 
option to help small business debtors “streamline the bankruptcy process 
by which [they] reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs.”4  
Traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures were often ineffective for 
small business debtors since the section was designed for larger, more 
sophisticated corporate debtors.5  Subchapter V empowers small business 
debtors by removing procedural barriers and lowering some financial 
hurdles to a reorganization in bankruptcy.6   
In subchapter V, the SBRA provides qualifying small business 
debtors with an alternative to traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy.7  
 
1. Paul W. Bonapfel, A Guide to the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 93 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 571, 574 (Winter 2019) (“[The SBRA] took effect on February 19, 2020, 180 
days after its enactment.”).   
2. Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (2020). 
3. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 576. (“SBRA does not repeal existing provisions that 
govern small business debtors in chapter 11. Those provisions continue to apply to small 
business debtors who do not elect to proceed under subchapter V.”). In this Note, the process 
established by the SBRA will be called “subchapter V”; the other avenue a debtor may choose, 
which existed prior to the SBRA and continues to exist, will be referred to as a “traditional 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.” 
4. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-171, at 1 (2019) (“H.R. 3311, the ‘Small Business Reorganization 
Act of 2019,’ would streamline the bankruptcy process by which small business debtors 
reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs.”). 
5. See Michael Blackmon, Revising the Debt Limit for “Small Business Debtors”: The 
Legislative Half-Measure of the Small Business Reorganization Act, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 339, 344 (2020) (“Traditional Chapter 11 does not ‘work for small and medium-
sized businesses because the [code] places unrealistic and artificial deadlines on small and 
medium-sized businesses’ which prevents them from restructuring.”).   
6.See id. (“Subchapter V provides debtors with ‘a powerful suite of tools to negotiate a 
deal with its creditors and, if negotiations break down, subchapter V provides a simplified 
method of confirming a Chapter 11 plan over a creditor's objection.’”). 
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 1187(a) (spelling out the debtor’s duties if he or she elects to use 
subchapter V). 
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However, the SBRA does not eliminate traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
procedures as a potential avenue for a qualifying small business debtor.8  
Traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures are still available to a 
debtor if he or she chooses to forego or is ineligible for the newly minted 
subchapter V.9  Only “small business debtors” as defined by the SBRA 
may access subchapter V.10  The SBRA defines a small business debtor 
as a person engaged in commercial or business activities with an 
aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debt of $7.5 
million at the date of the petition’s filing.11 
The SBRA removed mechanisms deemed by many to be cost-
prohibitive administrative expenses and disclosure efforts.12  Traditional 
Chapter 11 reorganizations provide for the appointment of a committee 
of unsecured creditors at the debtor’s expense, but this provision is not 
carried over to subchapter V cases.13  Unlike traditional Chapter 11 
reorganizations, subchapter V does not require the written disclosure 
statement to be provided by the debtor.14  Instead, Subchapter V cases 
make the “Absolute Priority Rule” inapplicable,15 and instead use the 
“Best Efforts Rule.”16  Traditional Chapter 11 reorganization cases take 
much longer than a subchapter V reorganization should take.17  Further, 
 
8. See Blackmon, supra note 5, at 576 (“SBRA does not repeal existing provisions that 
govern small business debtors in chapter 11. Those provisions continue to apply to small 
business debtors who do not elect to proceed under subchapter V.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1181 
(establishing certain provisions of traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy inapplicable in 
subchapter V bankruptcy proceedings). 
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (stating which specific provisions of the traditional Chapter 11 
bankruptcy process do not apply in subchapter V or apply only conditionally in the subchapter 
V process yet leaving the traditional Chapter 11 process available to debtors). 
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining which debtors qualify as a small business under the 
SBRA and therefore who may access subchapter V). 
11. See id. 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making both 11 U.S.C. § 1102 and 11 U.S.C. §1125 inapplicable); 
11 U.S.C. § 1102 (“[T]he United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding 
unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees of creditors or of equity security 
holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (requiring a 
written disclosure statement to be provided to the Court in connection with its filed plan). 
13.11 U.S.C. § 1181 (setting forth provisions of Chapter 11 bankruptcy which are not 
applicable in subchapter V). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule, which requires debtors to 
put all of his or her projected disposable income to be received in the three to five years toward 
making payments under the plan following the first payment due under the confirmed plan). 
17. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (requiring the debtor to file a plan within 90 days of the 
order for relief in a subchapter V case) with 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (requiring a plan to be filed 
within 300 days of the filing date in a traditional Chapter 11 case). 
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the SBRA grants small business debtors enormous flexibility once their 
plan is filed on subchapter V’s expedited basis.18   
While SBRA is an admirable attempt to give salvageable small 
businesses a lifeline, it goes too far in protecting debtors.19  It allows 
debtors to hide information regarding their finances since it requires little 
disclosure.20  Further, it grants debtors too much leniency by neither 
setting a time limit for plan confirmation nor limiting the modifications a 
debtor may make to the plan once it is filed.21  Though the maze of filing 
deadlines, barrage of fees and administrative expenses, and destruction 
of equity rights in the business have long deterred small business owners 
from choosing to enter Chapter 11, the reforms of the SBRA subchapter 
V of Chapter 11 bankruptcy have swung the pendulum too far in the other 
direction, much to the detriment of creditors.22   
While small business interests in reorganization are crucial in the 
United States economy, the free and easy flow of credit is equally 
important.  This Note examines the substantial debtor-friendly changes 
made to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy in subchapter V of Chapter 11 for 
small business debtors, analyzes the actions debtors are likely to take in 
the reorganization process, and ultimately concludes that the SBRA goes 
too far in empowering small business debtors to the detriment of 
creditors’ rights.23   
The Note proceeds in six parts. Part I introduces the SBRA and 
discusses how it weakens creditors’ recoveries.24 Part II discusses the 
informational asymmetry caused by removing statutory tools creditors 
need to gather information about the debtor’s financial state of affairs, 
and addresses the inadequacy of counterbalancing measures in the SBRA 
to ensure adequate information is provided to the small business debtor’s 
 
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1193(a) (allowing debtors to modify their plan at any time before 
confirmation so long as the plan meets the requirements of § 1122 and § 1123).   
19. See Blackmon, supra note 5, at 345 (“Thus, the SBRA ‘holds the promise of improving 
the likelihood of reorganization for a viable small business debtor by reducing the time, 
expense of a proceeding, and eliminating certain legal impediments to confirmation of a 
Chapter 11 plan.’”). 
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable the statutory requirements of filing a 
disclosure statement and the formation of unsecured creditors’ committees); see also 
Christopher G. Bradley, The New Small Business Bankruptcy Game: Strategies for Creditors 
Under the Small Business Reorganization Act, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 251, 274 (2020) 
(“The problem of disposable income manipulation is exacerbated by the lowered disclosure 
requirements of subchapter V.”).   
21. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (“The lack of a deadline for confirmation or of 
limitations on plan modification may present serious concerns for creditors.”).   
22. Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining who qualifies as a 
small business debtor for the purposes of the SBRA). 
23. Bradley, supra note 20. 
24. See infra Part I 
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creditors.25  Part III discusses problems with the new Best Efforts Rule 
and the ways in which these problems are exacerbated by the statutorily 
manufactured problem of asymmetrical information.26  Part IV discusses 
potential solutions to the problem posed by the informational 
asymmetries in the context of determining what a debtor’s “Best Efforts” 
ought to be under a confirmed plan.27 Part V discusses the undue leverage 
granted to debtors by the lack of a required time frame for plan 
confirmation and the capacity of bankruptcy judges to prevent plan 
modification as a means of twisting the arms of creditors.28  Finally, Part 
VI  draws conclusions.29 
II.  KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: HOW THE SBRA WEAKENS CREDITORS’ 
CAPACITY TO RECEIVE PROPER PAYMENT 
Subchapter V creates a mountain of asymmetrical information 
problems for creditors seeking to recover from a debtor in bankruptcy; it 
does so by removing crucial investigative mechanisms that were deemed 
cost-prohibitive administrative expenses and procedural tasks.30  Though 
the lack of disclosure statements in subchapter V cases is a boon to 
debtors seeking to reorganize quickly and cheaply,31 its absence will soon 
prove to be a bane to creditors seeking to enforce their rights.32   
Both the Chapter 11 creditors’ committee and the required 
disclosure statement served important functions in providing information 
to creditors during the debtor’s reorganization in a traditional small 
 
25. See infra Part II. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See infra Part IV. 
28. See infra Part V. 
29. See infra Part VI. 
30. Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making both 11 U.S.C. § 1102 
and 11 U.S.C. §1125 inapplicable); 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (“[T]he United States trustee shall 
appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional 
committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the United States trustee deems 
appropriate.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (requiring a written disclosure statement to be provided to 
the Court in connection with its filed plan). 
31.  See Ethan D. Dunn, Faster, Cost-Effective, and Streamlined Reorganization Under 
Subchapter V, MICH. B.J. (June 2020) at 35–36 (discussing the ways in which the SBRA 
removes hurdles, such as mandatory disclosure statements and the appointment of unsecured 
creditors’ committees, to a small business’ successful reorganization under subchapter V of 
Chapter 11). 
32. See generally, Bradley, supra note 20 (discussing the ways the SBRA will damage 
creditors). 
2021] SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION ACT 599 
business Chapter 11 reorganization.33  Information regarding the debtor’s 
financial state of affairs is at a premium when calculating what the 
payments ought to be under a confirmed plan, for a debtor’s ability to 
hide financial information can effectively allow him or her to lowball 
creditors in the confirmed plan.34   
Under a traditional small business Chapter 11 reorganization, 
debtors would be required to file disclosure statements providing 
creditors “adequate information.”35  Adequate information is a high 
standard; it requires debtors to provide information about a debtor’s 
books, records, federal tax consequences, and other information that 
would enable a hypothetical investor to make an informed judgment 
about the plan.36  The debtor must make “full and fair disclosure” during 
the entire reorganization process beginning from the date the Chapter 11 
petition is filed.37  Courts have found a disclosure statement inadequate 
for various reasons, including: failure to enumerate assets and liabilities, 
failure to provide reasons for the debtor’s financial difficulty, failure to 
provide creditors with the cash requirement needed by debtors to operate 
their properties, failing to identify any escrowed funds held on behalf of 
debtor’s tenants, failing to reveal the status of any pending litigation 
 
33. Bob Lawless, The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 and COVID-19, CREDIT 
SLIPS (Mar. 15, 2020) https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/03/the-small-business-
reorganization-act-of-2019-and-covid-19.html. [https://perma.cc/2HXP-NZ6F] (discussing 
the power of the procedural aspects the SBRA makes inapplicable and the capacity debtors 
will have to abuse the subchapter V process without some oversight). 
34. Bradley, supra note 20, at 274. (“The problem of disposable income manipulation is 
exacerbated by the lowered disclosure requirements of subchapter V.”). 
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (requiring debtors to file disclosure statements providing 
creditors with “adequate information” about the business). 
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (defining “adequate information” to require the provision 
of  information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of 
the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and records, 
including a discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the 
debtor, any successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims 
or interests in the case, that would enable such a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to 
make an informed judgment about the plan.).   
37. In re Momentum Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 1132, 1136 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Of prime importance 
in the reorganization process is the principle of disclosure. The Code obliges a Debtor to 
engage in full and fair disclosure, providing to creditors ‘information of a kind, and in 
sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable . . . that would enable a hypothetical 
reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to make an 
informed judgment about the plan . . . This disclosure requirement does not attach only to the 
preparation of disclosure statements. ‘Full and fair’ disclosure is required during 
the entire reorganization process; it begins ‘on day one, with the filing of the Chapter 11 
petition.’”) (emphasis added).  
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against debtors and their assets, and failing to identify tax consequences 
which might arise as result of the  debtor’s reorganization.38 
Subchapter V removes the disclosure statement requirement 
unless the bankruptcy court orders it.39  Subchapter V’s most intensive 
disclosure requirement mandates only that a filed plan include a brief 
history of the debtor’s business operations, a liquidation analysis, and 
projections about the debtor’s ability to make payments under the 
proposed plan of reorganization.40  The SBRA, however, does not 
provide for judicial review to determine what the minimum disclosure 
requirements may be.41  Put simply, the adequate information standard is 
a much more exacting standard than subchapter V’s disclosure 
requirements, and such information is crucial to creditors in the 
bargaining process.42  
The SBRA’s abolition of creditors’ committees furthers the 
assault on a creditor’s capacity to collect information about the debtor’s 
financial affairs.43  Traditional Chapter 11 allows unsecured creditors to 
 
38. Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The bankruptcy court found that 
the Statement failed: (1) to enumerate the assets and liabilities, accounts receivable, physical 
condition and maintenance required for each parcel of real property; (2) to provide the reason 
for debtors' financial difficulty; (3) to provide the creditors with the cash requirements needed 
by the debtors to operate the properties; (4) to identify any escrowed funds held on behalf of 
the debtors' tenants; (5) to reveal the status of any pending litigation against the debtors and 
their assets; and (6) to identify the tax consequences which may arise as a result of the debtors' 
reorganization. These failures are clearly contrary to § 1125(a)(1); therefore, we must reject 
the Halls' contention that the bankruptcy court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous.”). 
39. See Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable 11 
U.S.C. § 1125’s disclosure statement requirement unless the court orders the production of a 
disclosure statement). 
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 1190 (setting forth the required contents of a subchapter V plan). 
41. Id.; see also Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 599 (“Subchapter V does not require that the 
plan contain ‘adequate information,’ and it does not provide for judicial review of the required 
information.”).   
42. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining “adequate information); see also In re 
Momentum Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d at 1136 (interpreting “adequate information” to require full 
and fair disclosure of information of a kind that would enable hypothetical reasonable 
investors to make an informed judgment about the proposed plan); Hall, 887 F.2d at 1043 
(holding that 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)’s “adequate information” standard required an extensive 
list of documentation regarding the debtor’s financial affairs) with 11 U.S.C.  § 1190 
(requiring plans filed under subchapter V to include a brief history of the debtor’s business 
operations, a liquidation analysis, and projections regarding the debtor’s ability to make 
payments under the proposed reorganization plan). 
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable § 1102); 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (“Unless the court 
for cause orders otherwise, a committee of creditors may not be appointed in a small business 
case or a case under subchapter V of this chapter.”). 
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appoint a committee of creditors.44  These committees of unsecured 
creditors had an investigative role in traditional small business 
bankruptcy cases.45  They examined the debtor’s acts, conduct, assets, 
liabilities, financial condition, business operations, and the desirability of 
continuance of the debtor’s business.46  Abolishing the unsecured 
creditors’ committee—which serves an information-gathering role—is 
yet another way that the SBRA saddles the capacity of creditors to obtain 
information about the financial affairs of the small business debtor.47 
The SBRA attempts to bridge this gap by appointing a trustee to 
help “facilitate the development of a consensual plan of 
reorganization.”48  The trustee’s duties are otherwise ill-defined,49 and it 
seems likely that the statute’s vaguely contemplated actions of the 
subchapter V trustee will be inadequate for the purposes of gathering 
information for creditors for several reasons.50  To begin, the SBRA 
imposes no duty upon the trustee to investigate the debtor’s affairs absent 
a court order.51  Trustees are likely to see their roles as helping to confirm 
a feasible plan because the SBRA is explicit in authorizing a trustee to 
 
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (“Except as provided in paragraph (3), as soon as practicable after 
the order for relief under chapter 11 of this title, the United States trustee shall appoint a 
committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees of 
creditors or of equity security holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate.”) 
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (“A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may . . . 
investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the 
operation of the debtor’s business, and the desirability of the continuance of such business, 
and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.).  
46. Id. 
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (making inapplicable 11 U.S.C. § 1125 which allowed classes of 
unsecured creditors to create a committee of unsecured creditors in the subchapter V process). 
48. Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(7) (“The trustee shall . . . 
facilitate the development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”); see also Ralph Brubaker, 
The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 39 BANKR. L. LETTER, NO. 10 at 1–4 (Oct. 
2019) (“Instead of committees, [Subchapter V, like Chapters 12 and 13] relies on [a] standing 
trustee to protect the rights of unsecured creditors.”). 
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (requiring the trustee to appear at conferences and be heard on 
several matters but not imposing a general duty to investigate); see also Bonapfel, supra note 
1, at 583 (“Although the responsibility of the Subsidiary V trustee to participate in the plan 
process and to be heard on plan and other matters implies a right to obtain information about 
the debtor’s property, business, and financial condition, a sub V trustee, like a chapter 12 
trustee, does not have the duty to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.”).   
50. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583 (discussing the necessary qualifications and roles 
suggested by practitioners the trustee might play in subchapter V cases); see also Lawless, 
supra note 33 (noting the role the trustee might take in differing circumstances). 
51.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(2) (requiring the trustee to play an investigative role as 
defined in § 1106(a)(3) only if the court so orders); 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3) (“A trustee shall . 
. . investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the 
operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and 
any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.”).  
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help a debtor develop a plan of reorganization and suggesting a goal of 
confirming a consensual plan.52  Not only does the trustee owe the 
creditors no duty, but the trustee’s financial interests could be at odds 
with unsecured creditors; his or her fees will be paid out of the disposable 
income plan payments before any unsecured creditors are paid.53  An 
active trustee would bill more hours, thereby reducing the amount of 
money that may otherwise go to unsecured creditors.54  Thus, a trustee is 
a poor substitute for the investigative powers of a secured creditors’ 
committee, as the trustee is unlikely to provide much information 
regarding the state of the debtor’s financial affairs.55 As will be discussed 
in Parts III and V respectively, this lack of information creates 
asymmetrical information when calculating plan payments under the Best 
Efforts Rule and attempting to object to improper plan modifications. 
III.  DEBTORS’ “BEST EFFORTS” TO DIMINISH CREDITORS’ RECOVERIES 
The SBRA’s abolition of the Absolute Priority Rule is among its 
most substantial changes to small business Chapter 11 reorganization.56  
Subchapter V cases make the Absolute Priority Rule inapplicable57 and 
instead uses the Best Efforts Rule.58  Under traditional small business 
Chapter 11 reorganizations, the Absolute Priority Rule prohibits 
 
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (requiring the appointment of a trustee in subchapter V cases and 
outlining the trustee’s duties); see also Donald L. Swanson, SBRA: Frequently Asked 
Questions and Some Answers, 39 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 2 (Nov. 2019) (“This provision is 
unique: in no other place does the Bankruptcy Code (1) authorize a trustee to help a debtor in 
possession develop a plan of reorganization, or (2) suggest the goal of a ‘consensual plan’ 
when the absolute-priority rule does not apply.”).   
53. Bradley, supra note 20, at 269 (“Second, the trustee’s financial interests may directly 
conflict with those of the unsecured creditors in particular. The fees of the trustee—which, as 
mentioned under the new Act may be paid over time as part of the plan—may drain any 
‘disposable income’ plan payments that would otherwise go to unsecured creditors.”).   
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)’s Absolute Priority 
Rule). 
57. Id. (making inapplicable § 1129(a)); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (establishing the Absolute 
Priority Rule, which dictates that junior creditors may not be paid before members of a 
dissenting class with claims senior to theirs nor can equity interest holders keep their equity 
under a plan if all senior claims are not first paid in full). 
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule, which requires debtors 
to put all of his or her projected disposable income to be received in the three to five years 
toward making payments under the plan following the first payment due under the confirmed 
plan). To be clear: the “Best Efforts Rule” is not the same as the “Best Interest Test.” The 
Best Interest Test, as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), requires all creditors to be paid at 
least as much in the Chapter 11 proceeding as they would otherwise get in a Chapter 7 
proceeding in order to confirm the plan, and it remains in full effect in both traditional and 
subchapter V bankruptcy proceedings. 
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absolutely both the paying of any junior creditor and prohibits any equity 
interest holder from retaining its interest if there were any senior claims 
that had yet to be fully paid.59 
If a small business debtor elects to proceed under subchapter V 
instead of traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures, the Absolute 
Priority Rule will not apply.60  Instead, subchapter V cases are governed 
by the Best Efforts Rule.61  The Best Efforts Rule requires all of the 
projected disposable income of the debtor to be received in a three to five 
year period after the first payment under the plan is due to be used to 
make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.62  The repayment 
period cannot exceed five years.63 
Courts apply the Absolute Priority Rule in traditional Chapter 11 
reorganizations to bar the debtor from retaining property without 
payment in full to unsecured creditors.64  Application of the Absolute 
Priority Rule ends many otherwise confirmable Chapter 11 plans, and is 
even more likely to end a traditional small business reorganization under 
Chapter 11 because reorganization may be impossible for a small 
business if the current owners cannot retain their interests.65  Smaller 
businesses are often owned and operated by a single individual with a 
personal stake in the business’s success.66  The Absolute Priority Rule 
deters small business debtors—particularly those that are solely owned 
and operated—from filing for Chapter 11 reorganization at all for fear 
that the debtor would lose its equity interest entirely if it was unable to 
pay all of the unsecured creditors’ claims.67 
 
59.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (establishing the Absolute Priority Rule, which dictates that 
junior creditors may not be paid before members of a dissenting class with claims senior to 
theirs nor can equity interest holders keep their equity under a plan if all senior claims are not 
first paid in full).   
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable § 1129(a) with respect to the unsecured 
creditors). 
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule, which requires 
debtors to put all of his or her projected disposable income to be received in the three to five 




64. Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 607 (“In an individual case, many courts conclude that the 
absolute priority rule prohibits the debtor from retaining property without payment in full to 
unsecured creditors.”). 
65.  See Dunn, supra note 31, at 36 (discussing the unique harm posed to small business 
cases in traditional Chapter 11 cases by the Absolute Priority Rule).  
66. Blackmon, supra note 5, at 349 (“A common feature of smaller businesses is a ‘unified 
ownership and management’ structure that emphasizes an owner’s personal stake in seeing 
the business thrive.”). 
67. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (barring equity holders from retaining their interests in the business 
unless all unsecured creditors’ claims are paid off first). 
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Subchapter V’s Best Efforts Rule is substantially more debtor-
friendly.68  The new Best Efforts Rule requires all of the projected 
disposable income of the debtor to be received in the three to five-year 
period after the first payment under the plan goes towards making 
payments on the plan.69  Key considerations in the confirmation of a plan 
under the Best Efforts Rule include: how projected disposable income is 
determined, how the court decides whether the required period should be 
longer than three years, and if it is to be longer than three years, how the 
court determines how much longer the period should be.70  The debtor 
need only estimate disposable income for a period of three to five years 
and pay that amount to creditors in order to retain their equity interest.71 
There is no requirement that anything be paid to unsecured creditors at 
all.72 
Whatever problems it has, abolition of the Absolute Priority Rule 
would frustrate the purposes of subchapter V.73  In essence, subchapter V 
allows existing business owners to maintain their control and ownership 
of the business even if they confirm a plan that does not pay a dime to 
general unsecured creditors.74  Despite the controversy over the failure to 
pay unsecured creditors, abolishing the Absolute Priority Rule was 
necessary to provide meaningful change for small business debtors 
because small businesses are commonly owned and operated by one 
person.75  The Absolute Priority Rule—if allowed to impact small 
business debtors under the SBRA—would operate to divorce the most 
interested party in the small business’ subchapter V reorganization from 
 
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the “Best Efforts Rule”). The “Best Efforts Rule” 
is not so named by the statute; scholars and judges have named 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) requiring 
debtors to allocate their disposable income to plan payments the “Best Efforts Rule.” 
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (“As of the effective date of the plan the plan provides that all 
of the projected disposable income of the debtor to be received in the 3-year period, or such 
longer period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix, beginning on the date that the first 
payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.”). 
70. Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 609 (“Key confirmation issues are: (1) How is projected 
disposable income determined? (2) How does the court determine whether the required period 
should be longer than three years?; and (3) If so, how does the court determine how much 
longer the period must be?”). 
71. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191 (discussing the necessary payments of disposable income to 
unsecured creditors without requiring that any money actually go to said unsecured creditors). 
72. Id. 
73. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 607 (discussing the consequences of replacing the 
Absolute Priority Rule with the Best Efforts Rule). 
74.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule in place of the Absolute 
Priority Rule for the purposes of subchapter V plan confirmation). 
75. Blackmon, supra note 5, at 349 (“A common feature of smaller businesses is a ‘unified 
ownership and management’ structure that emphasizes an owners’ personal stake in seeing 
the business thrive.”). 
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his interest in the business.76  This is necessary for the continuation of the 
business if reorganization is to occur, in the service of unsecured creditors 
who are likely to receive a smaller payout anyway.77  Though the 
abolition of the Absolute Priority Rule is necessary for the SBRA to 
function, the Best Efforts Rule goes too far, much to the detriment of 
creditors.78 
That the Best Efforts Rule is more desirable than the Absolute 
Priority Rule in the context of  bankruptcy reorganizations of small 
business debtors says little about its own merits.79  The Best Efforts Rule 
requires a plan to provide that all of the projected disposable income of 
the debtor be applied to make payments under the plan.80  The statutory 
definition of disposable income requires the debtor to subtract certain 
expenses from his projected revenue during the three to five year period 
during which they are making plan payments.81  Expenses which are 
“reasonably necessary to be expended . . . for the payment of expenditures 
necessary for the continuation, preservation, or operation of the business 
debtor” fall outside of the statute’s definition of “disposable income.”82  
Though this rule contemplates the payment of items like payroll, utilities, 
rent, insurance, taxes, acquisition of inventory or raw materials, and other 
expenses ordinarily occurred when running a business, problems arise 
when the debtor wishes to establish a reserve or invest income to increase 
the business’ profitability.83 
 
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (forbidding a debtor from retaining an interest in the business 
unless unsecured creditors are paid in full). 
77. Id. 
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule in place of the Absolute 
Priority Rule for the purposes of subchapter V plan confirmation). 
79. See id. (defining a plan to be “fair and equitable with respect to each class of claims or 
interests” if it “provides that all of the projected disposable income of the debtor to be received 
in the 3-year period, or such longer period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix, 
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make 
payments under the plan.”). 
80. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (setting forth the disposable income requirement of the Best 
Efforts Rule). 
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d)(1)(B) (defining “disposable income” not to include expenses 
necessary for the continuation, preservation, or operation of the debtor’s business). 
82.  See id. (excluding particular expenses necessary for the continuation and operation of 
the debtor’s business from the definition of “disposable income”). 
83. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d)(2) (allowing deductions from “disposable income” where the 
expenditure is reasonably necessary to the operation of the business); see also Bonapfel, supra 
note 1, at 611 (discussing what expenditures are and are not to be considered “reasonably 
necessary to be expended” for “maintenance or support” under § 1191).   
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The permissible expenditures of disposable income are written 
vaguely and encourage malfeasance by subchapter V debtors.84  The 
statutory language as written will incentivize small business debtors to 
calculate projected revenues at the lowest possible level while 
maximizing projected expenses, thereby producing an artificially low 
disposable income to be paid to unsecured creditors.85  This sort of debtor 
malfeasance is not only encouraged but rewarded: if the projected 
disposable income is lower than the actual profit, then the statute provides 
no obligation that the debtor share the additional profits with his creditors 
or even inform them of his miscalculation.86  The language of the statute’s 
exclusions from the Best Efforts Rule is itself vague and easily 
manipulated too.87  Many expenditures can be argued to be “necessary 
for the . . . preservation” of the business, and courts are very likely to 
defer to the trustee—who has statutorily granted discretion to investigate 
the debtor’s property, business, and financial condition and monitor the 
debtor’s payments—if the trustee allows a given expenditure.88 
Debtors know more about their own finances and prospects than 
do their creditors.89  Debtors have every incentive to minimize estimated 
revenues and to maximize their projected expenses to decrease their 
projected disposable income90 and there is no requirement that any 
 
84. See 11 U.S.C.  § 1191(c) (requiring disposable income to be paid to unsecured creditors 
for a period of three to five years after the payment period has begun); see also § 1191(d) 
(setting forth expenses which may be excluded).  
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d) (excluding “expenditures necessary for the continuation, 
preservation, or operation of the business of the debtor” and “for the maintenance or support 
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor” from the definition of disposable income which 
must be paid to unsecured creditors). However, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(2) still requires that 
secured creditors either retain their liens or be paid in full in order to confirm the plan. 
86.  See id. (setting forth the requirements for disposable income); see also Bradley, supra 
note 20, at 273 (discussing the incentives for and ways in which debtors may misrepresent 
their disposable income as per the § 1191(d)). 
87. See 11 U.S.C § 1191(d). (excluding expenditures necessary for the continuation, 
preservation, or operation of the business of the debtor); see also Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 
611 (“[§ 1191(d)(2) contemplates the payment of items such as payroll, utilities, rent, 
insurance, taxes, acquisition of inventory or raw materials, and other expenses ordinarily 
incurred in the course of running the business.”).   
88. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583–84 (listing the statutory powers and duties of the 
trustee in a subchapter V case); see also Brendan G. Best, Challenging the Sub-V Election, 
39 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 47 (Dec. 2020) (discussing courts’ deference to trustees regarding 
the trustee’s decisions to exercise their discretion in not appointing unsecured creditors’ 
committees). 
89. Bradley, supra note 20, at 274–75 (“Debtors have superior information about their own 
finances and their future prospects, and they will be capable of producing the three to five 
year income projections that best suit their preferences.”). 
90. Id at 274 (“The problem of disposable income manipulation is exacerbated by the 
lowered disclosure requirements of subchapter V.”). 
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additional profit beyond the projected disposable income be shared with 
creditors or even disclosed.91  The lack of a disclosure statement creates 
an asymmetrical information problem. This issue combines with the 
debtor’s incentive to minimize estimated revenues and maximize 
estimated expenses in order to lowball creditors. These actions go 
undetected because the debtor will never have to disclose the disparity 
between the reported disposable estimates and actual disposable 
income.92 
IV.  MITIGATION: TRYING TO CONSTRAIN THE BEST EFFORTS RULE 
The potentially flexible definition of “necessary expenditure” 
under the Best Efforts Rule is problematic by itself, but its harm is 
compounded by the inability of the creditors to acquire information 
regarding the debtor’s financial state.93  The removal of unsecured 
creditors’ committees, the lack of disclosure statements,94 the 
ineffectiveness of the appointed trustee due to the trustee’s ill-defined 
statutory role in subchapter V cases,95 the incentive for debtors to mislead 
creditors on their projected revenues and expenses,96 and the unclear 
parameters of what constitutes an “expenditure necessary for the 
continuation, preservation, or operation of the business debtor” make the 
Best Efforts Rule rife with opportunities for abuse by crafty debtors.97  
If courts provide leniency with regard to what expenditures are 
necessary for the continuation of the business, a legislative solution may 
be necessary.98  The first proposed legislative solution would be to better 
define what constitutes an expenditure necessary to the preservation or 
the continuation of the business under the Best Efforts Rule.99  While a 
 
91. Id. at 259 (“And remarkably, if the debtor’s disposable income proves to be higher than 
estimated, there is no requirement that the additional profit be shared with creditors.”). 
92. Id. at 274 (“The problem of disposable income manipulation is exacerbated by the 
lowered disclosure requirements of subchapter V.”). 
93. See id. at 269 (discussing how the trustee can be used to minimize the worst effects of 
the Best Efforts Rule on creditors). 
94. See Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (2020) (removing the 
required disclosure statement and the requirements for creditors’ committees). 
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (defining the role of the subchapter V trustee). 
96. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 273 (discussing the incentives for fudging the numbers 
regarding projected revenues and projected expenses). 
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c).  
98. Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (arguing that courts are likely to be lenient to newly 
reorganized subchapter V debtors in the wake of their emergence from subchapter V 
reorganization).   
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d) (allowing the deduction of expenditures necessary to the 
continuation of the business from the disposable income payments). 
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perfect definition is perhaps not possible due to the statute’s purpose,100 
some boundaries are necessary to help courts balance debtor 
reorganization and the proper payment of debts to creditors under the 
Best Effort Rule in order to prevent debtors from exempting frivolities 
from their disposable income.101 
The other potentially useful amendment to the SBRA would be 
to better define the subchapter V trustee’s role in the case.102  Specifically, 
this could be amended to impose a duty of investigation and disclosure 
rather than what appears to be a minimal, mediatory role.103  This would 
form a better compromise between the debtor and creditors than simple 
mediation because it could make up for some of the information 
deficiency created by the removal of unsecured creditors’ committees and 
the inapplicability of the required disclosure statement in subchapter V 
cases.104  The major downside to this amendment is that it may harm 
unsecured creditors in some instances by engaging the subchapter V 
trustee more, thus driving up expenses to be paid out of the disposable 
income otherwise available to creditors.105  Still, subchapter V cases 
differ on their facts, and, if there is sufficient capacity for the debtor to 
produce disposable income, then the expended fees may end up 
increasing recoveries despite increased trustee fees.106  This would make 
it more difficult for the debtor to game its projected revenue and expense 
numbers in an attempt to decrease disposable income that must be paid 
to unsecured creditors.107  
 
100. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-171, at 1 (2019) (“H.R. 3311, the ‘Small Business 
Reorganization Act of 2019,’ would streamline the bankruptcy process by which small 
business debtors reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs.”).   
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d) (setting forth the Best Efforts Rule and the disposable income 
requirements therein).   
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (setting forth the duties and powers of the subchapter V trustee). 
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (setting forth the duties of the subchapter V trustee); see also 
Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583 (“Although the responsibility of the sub V trustee to participate 
in the plan process and to be heard on plan and other matters implies a right to obtain 
information about the debtor’s property, business, and financial condition, a sub V trustee, 
like a chapter 12 trustee, does not have the duty to investigate the financial affairs of the 
debtor.”).   
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making the provisions allowing the appointment of a committee of 
unsecured creditors and the requirement that debtors file a disclosure statement inapplicable 
in subchapter V cases); see also Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583 (“Although the responsibility 
of the sub V trustee to participate in the plan process and to be heard on plan and other matters 
implies a right to obtain information about the debtor’s property, business, and financial 
condition, a sub V trustee, like a chapter 12 trustee, does not have the duty to investigate the 
financial affairs of the debtor.”).   
105. Bradley, supra note 20, at 269 (discussing the ways in which trustee’s fees may drain 
any “disposable income” which would otherwise go to unpaid unsecured creditors). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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V.  THE LACK OF REQUIRED TIME FRAMES TO CONFIRM PROPOSED PLANS 
In addition to the disadvantage in bargaining imposed upon 
creditors by asymmetrical information caused by the removal of 
procedural obligations, creditors are further harmed in the bargaining 
process by the SBRA’s required timeline.108  If a debtor elects to 
reorganize under traditional Chapter 11 processes, he or she must file a 
plan within 300 days of the filing date.109 Only the small business debtor 
may file a plan in the first 180 days after the date for the order for relief 
in a traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy.110  The debtor must then confirm 
a plan within forty-five days of filing the plan.111  This is not so in 
subchapter V cases.112  
Subchapter V reorganizations are much swifter than traditional 
Chapter 11 reorganizations of small businesses.113  The debtor must file 
a plan within ninety days of the order for relief.114  The SBRA requires 
the small business debtor to hold a status conference within sixty days of 
the order for relief to “further the expeditious and economical resolution 
of a case” under subchapter V.115  The small business debtor must file and 
serve a report on all parties detailing the efforts the debtor has and will 
make to attain a consensual plan of reorganization at least fourteen days 
before that conference.116  No creditor will ever have an opportunity to 
file a competing plan in a subchapter V case.117  The debtor may modify 
any plan it files at any time so long as the plan has not been confirmed; 
there is no limitation on the number of modifications the debtor can make 
 
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (granting subchapter V debtors the exclusive right and obligation 
to file a plan within 90 days after the order for relief); 11 U.S.C. § 1191 (discussing the 
requirements for plan confirmation). 
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (requiring a plan to be filed within 300 days of the filing date in 
a traditional Chapter 11 case). 
110. See id. (“In a small business case . . . only the debtor may file a plan until after 180 
days after the date of the order for relief . . . “). 
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(e) (setting a 45-day deadline for confirmation once the 
reorganization plan is filed). 
112. 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (requiring the debtor to file a plan within 90 days of the order for 
relief in a subchapter V case). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1188(a) (mandating a status conference for small business debtors within 
60 days of the entry for the order of relief). 
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1188(c) (mandating a report no later than 14 days before the mandatory 
status conference). 
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (granting debtors the exclusive right to file a plan in subchapter V 
cases). 
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to the plan before it is confirmed.118  There is no deadline by which a filed 
plan must be confirmed.119  
The SBRA granted debtors great leverage over creditors whose 
recoveries are reduced by delays in subchapter V reorganization 
proceedings.120  As the time spent in the reorganization process drags on, 
the bankruptcy estate will spend more money and the case will lose value, 
thereby damaging creditor recoveries.121 The small business debtor can 
prolong this process using subchapter V’s procedural tools, for the debtor 
can act to damage creditor recoveries by extending the time spent in the 
subchapter V bankruptcy reorganization process by utilizing its capacity 
to unilaterally amend the filed plan before it is confirmed.122  Each time 
the debtor does so the case will be extended, assets will diminish, and 
there will be no end to this gamesmanship in sight because there is no 
time frame in which a filed plan must be confirmed under the subchapter 
V process.123 
While creditors will be impacted differently by this sort of 
gamesmanship depending on their security or priority, the extent of the 
assets present in a given case may still incentivize even well-situated 
creditors to be leveraged into agreeing to confirmation plans in an 
endeavor to protect or salvage their own recoveries, which only diminish 
as the process drags on.124   Meanwhile, debtors are incentivized to claim 
that they are working without rest to form a reasonable and confirmable 
 
118. 11 U.S.C. § 1193 (allowing debtor to modify a plan at any time before confirmation). 
119. Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (arguing the lack of a deadline for confirmation or of 
limitations on plan modification may present serious concerns for creditors); 11 U.S.C. § 1189 
(discussing filing a plan); § 1191 (setting confirmation requirements); 11 U.S.C. § 1193 
(allowing debtor to modify an unconfirmed plan at any time). 
120. Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (discussing he ways in which debtors can extend their 
cases to gain leverage over creditors). 
121. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A 
Challenge to Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 625 (2009) (“The professional fees and other 
expenses associated with a Chapter 11 case diminish the value available to creditors . . . In 
addition, the time spent in bankruptcy itself leads to the loss in value, comprising an indirect 
cost.”). 
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (granting debtors the exclusive right to file a plan in subchapter V 
cases); § 1193 (allowing debtor to modify a plan at any time before confirmation). 
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable § 1129(e)); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(e) (requiring 
small business debtors to confirm a filed plan within 45 days). 
124. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 107, at 625 (“The professional fees and other 
expenses associated with a Chapter 11 case diminish the value available to creditors . . . In 
addition, the time spent in bankruptcy itself leads to the loss in value, comprising an indirect 
cost.”). 
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plan, and they need only a bit more information about their financial 
futures to finish it.125  
The problem of asymmetrical information arises once again in 
this context. Despite the importance of not allowing disingenuous 
statements to go unchallenged where the creditor has good reasons to 
doubt the debtor’s good faith, the creditor is less likely to have the 
information necessary to articulate such a reason due to the diminished 
disclosure requirements of the debtor, the lack of an investigating entity, 
and the subchapter V trustee’s role as a mediator rather than an 
investigator.126  
There are several possible solutions to the leverage posed by the 
lack of a confirmation deadline in the SBRA.127  The clearest option 
would be to amend the statute to set a deadline by which a plan must be 
confirmed after filing a confirmation plan in accordance with statutory 
procedures to prevent indefinite diminution of a case’s value.128   
However, such an amendment may be slow in coming, and the 
responsibility may rest with judges to protect the value of cases and 
thereby creditor recoveries by taking more skeptical positions towards 
the debtor throughout the process to ensure that modifications to 
unconfirmed filed plans are made in good faith rather than to twist 
creditors’ arms.129 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The SBRA seeks to reduce the time spent in the reorganization 
process for subchapter V debtors by removing expensive and the time-
consuming barriers to the benefits of successful Chapter 11 
 
125. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (arguing that debtors will use § 1193 to modify 
and extend the time it takes to confirm their cases to gain bargaining leverage over creditors 
by diminishing creditors’ recoveries). 
126. Id. at 269 (“While subchapter V trustees are not statutorily charged with investigating 
the debtor’s affairs, most trustees will likely feel uncomfortable ignoring credible complaints, 
and will undertake to develop at least some view regarding the credibility of debtors’ financial 
information and projections. A “squeaky wheel” strategy may work for a creditor that can 
articulate concrete and well-founded objections to the debtor’s proposed course of action.”). 
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (setting forth filing requirements for subchapter V debtors); 11 
U.S.C. § 1191 (setting forth the requirements of a confirmable plan); § 1193 (setting forth 
requirements for modification of a proposed yet unconfirmed plan). 
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191 (lacking a deadline for plan confirmation). 
129. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (“The lack of a deadline for confirmation or of 
limitations on plan modification may present serious concerns for creditors. Debtors may well 
develop the practice of filing placeholder plans early in the case and then modifying them 
over time—perhaps over great lengths of time. In the absence of statutory guidance 
concerning the permissibility of such behavior, creditors may appeal to the court for relief.”). 
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reorganizations for small businesses.130  The SBRA removes required 
disclosure statements and barred the appointment of unsecured creditors’ 
committees to reduce the costs and complexity of Chapter 11 
reorganization for small business debtors.131  However, the 
inapplicability of these provisions may harm creditors’ capacity to 
effectively gather information about the state of the debtor’s financial 
affairs.132  An informational asymmetry was created that gives debtors 
increased leverage in negotiating plan confirmations.  The best way to 
alleviate this informational asymmetry is to impose a duty of 
investigation on the subchapter V trustee.133 
In the absence of a reformed SBRA granting creditors a greater 
ability to discover information about debtors’ financial state of affairs, 
debtors will be incentivized to hide the ball in calculating their disposable 
income under the Best Efforts Rule.134  Debtors will undervalue projected 
income, overvalue expenses, and attempt to argue for deductions from 
the Best Effort Rule’s disposable income requirement for expenditures 
reasonably necessary for the continuation of the business.  Due to the 
decreased capacity of creditors to gain information about the debtor’s 
financial affairs, this will be even more difficult to combat.  The best 
remedy available is for the legislature to set a stricter standard for what 
sort of expenditures are necessary for the continuation of the business.  
Finally, the lack of a deadline for plan confirmation in subchapter 
V reorganizations grants debtors too much negotiation leverage over 
creditors because the debtor will be empowered to hold up the case 
through modifications to the plan so long as it remains unconfirmed.  If 
 
130. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 574 (“The purpose of SBRA is ‘to streamline the 
process by which small business debtors reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs.’ A 
sponsor of the legislation stated that it allows small business debtors ‘to file bankruptcy in a 
timely, cost-effective manner, and hopefully allows them to remain in business,’ which ‘not 
only benefits the owners, but employees, suppliers, customers, and others who rely on that 
business.’”).   
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable the provisions of the bankruptcy code 
requiring debtors seeking to undergo Chapter 11 bankruptcy to file disclosure statements or 
fund appointed unsecured creditors’ committees).   
132. See Bradley, supra note 20 (arguing that some of the SBRA’s reforms damaged 
creditors’ ability to investigate debtors’ financial situations). 
133. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583–84 (discussing how a court may impose 
investigative duties upon the subchapter V trustee if the judge finds it necessary); see also 
Bradley, supra note 20, at 269 (“While subchapter V trustees are not statutorily charged with 
investigating the debtor’s affairs, most trustees will likely feel uncomfortable ignoring 
credible complaints, and will undertake to develop at least some view regarding the credibility 
of debtors’ financial information and projections.”). 
134. 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (setting forth the Best Efforts Rule requiring debtor to dedicate 
projected disposable income to be received to making payments under the confirmed 
reorganization plan). 
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the debtor manages to successfully delay the confirmation of a plan and 
prolong the reorganization process then the case’s value will decline, and 
creditor recovery will too.  An amendment to the SBRA limiting the 
debtor’s capacity to amend filed plans would cede an appropriate amount 
of the leverage back to creditors, but judges can effectuate this same 
policy by taking a more skeptical view of debtors’ claims when 
modifications are requested.  
JONAH R. HALL 
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